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The Deconcentration of Poverty as an Example of
Derrick Bell’s Interest-Convergence Dilemma:
White Neutrality Interests, Prisons, and Changing
Inner Cities
Justin Stec
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

The idea of deconcentrating the poor from neighborhoods of concentrated poverty
has arisen as a concept and policy position in the last twenty years to become part of the
language and mental framework surrounding the alleviation of disparate conditions in a
spatialized urban lens. Areas of concentrated poverty (where over forty percent of the
inhabitants live at or below the poverty line) provide havens for social ills, where the sum
of these ills is considered “greater than the whole.” 1 Violence, drug use, low life
expectancy rates, and a lack of social services and meaningful educational opportunities
typify such neighborhoods. Such neighborhoods are also highly segregated by race.
Hence, deconcentration programs literally work to disperse people into a greater
geographic area (away from concentrated poverty) with the hopes that they will reap
“neighborhood effects” or the better social and economic opportunities that exist away
from their current neighborhoods.
Deconcentration schemes are associative in nature because their success is
predicated on a constellation of interactive behavioral patterns, including access to
material opportunities and the diminishment or reduction of negative factors (e.g., crime,
bad schools) in an effort to allow higher levels of personal agency and fulfillment through
exposure to social networks. Stated differently, it is thought that deconcentrating poverty
will be beneficial because the initial compounding factor of poverty in a dense spatial
area results in an amplification of social problems on its own. Deconcentrating poverty
relies on a model of indirect support. Attached to the primary idea of movement is the
secondary expectation that the move will mean something positive for a host of related
objective and subjective factors. This is a critical point, because it requires that we
recognize what occurred in the past to manufacture the concentration of poverty in its full
purview and understand the dynamics of indirect support. It is also necessary to see
parallel related fields that utilize the same normative structure as deconcentration for
similar ameliorative goals.
Such reasoning is reminiscent of the landmark 1954 ruling of Brown v. Board of
Education, 2 wherein the segregation of pubic schools was declared discriminatory. The
prescriptive result in Brown was to mandate a spatial change, impliedly focusing on the
need to integrate a basic function of socialization (education) to better serve part of the
1
2

EDWARD GOETZ, CLEARING THE WAY: DECONCENTRATING THE POOR IN URBAN AMERICA 3 (2003).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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population. In the Brown context, like in the context of housing and deconcentration,
inequality was, at its core, based on denied material goods because of earlier spatial
exclusion. To “fix” the historical problem of denial was to change a spatial aspect of
inequality, pushing it toward the notion of assimilation or integration as a paradigmatic
(and correct) norm. This solution was not solely to directly produce material equality for
a group systematically denied such resources. Instead, it was indirectly to collect benefits
through closer proximity to those benefits, whether social or material. This distinction
remains quite important because it informs the ideological standpoint of progress and an
appeal toward what may seem obvious for many when dealing with hard social decisions
from a policy standpoint: getting people closer to goods will help them obtain those
goods.
But not everyone agrees. In 1980, Derrick Bell 3 wrote a radical critique of the
Brown decision. 4 Bell argued that any benefits to blacks 5 from the decision were
incidental to, and contingent upon, benefits that whites received. Bell’s radically
transgressive argument is that blacks will only receive help when white interests are
implicated (and assuaged), even when (or perhaps especially when) white interests
remain silent. Neglected in the Brown decision was the implicit norm of whiteness and
white privilege, which in turn allows the subtle re-instantiation of such privilege, helping
to produce the same racial norms and codes of behavior that led to Brown in the first
place. Bell argues that the decision helped whites stay in power in multiple ways, all of
which stayed below the radar of explicit legal doctrine at the time.
Acts that directly help blacks 6 must implicate white interests because white
economic (and other) interests and black oppression are inextricably interwoven and
depend on each other for their survival. Thus, spatial acts that work to form material
success for oppressed groups are a type of this indirect system, rather than a direct system
(even, at times, when purportedly under a direct system). Bell says direct help to
disenfranchised groups will not occur, but only the secondary type of help (in this case
spatial proximity or access) will occur, and when it does, the main beneficiaries will not
be the intended group.
But why does he argue this? Direct help would bring to the surface a direct
justification, and hence, long-held institutional, psychological, financial and personal
privilege that has accrued over time. Such privilege has become so pervasive and
entrenched that a direct move can be seen as an admittance of white responsibility in
black oppression. 7 This is paradoxical because such a schema maintains whiteness as a
3

Derrick Bell left his professorship at Harvard Law School to protest the fact that Harvard did not hire
enough (or any) minority women.
4
Derrick Bell, The Interest-Convergence Dilemma and Brown v. Board of Education, 93 HARV. L. REV.
518 (1980).
5
Throughout this article I use the terms “blacks” and “whites” predominantly, partially because Bell used
these terms, and also because they are the most direct.
6
Note that African Americans have typically been defined that way in American society if they have “one
drop” of African American blood, but in reality, many African Americans are really now Euro-African
Americans, as well as the other way around (many Euro-Americans are also African-American). However
difficult and paradoxical the debates around essentialism have become, I will say that because we live in an
essentialist world, I will continue in a similar vein, albeit cautiously, if only for the sake of simplicity, and
however much this bothers me.
7
Bell has argued that it might have been better if Plessy v. Ferguson was actually enforced to the fullest
extent possible. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL, THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 47-64
(1993).
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neutral category that can naturalize white hierarchical placement as solely merit-based
and largely individualized, further disassociating and minimizing the need for
rectification.
In this article, I apply Bell’s analytical framework to deconcentration policies and
argue that they represent an interest-convergence of their own. In Section II, I lay out
Bell’s argument more thoroughly and provide a background of deconcentration policies.
I then summarize some of the drastic spatial and racialized separation that occurred
nationwide (through the highway system, slum removal programs, and public housing)
simultaneously with the Brown decision. This spatializing of inequality, with blacks left
largely in inner cities, worked to allow a societal and policy-based definition of such
spaces as categorically “criminal.” It would be utilized by politicians in the 1980s as a
justification for the War on Drugs and decreasing social support of inner-city
communities. It would also be utilized to justify the alleviation of poverty via
deconcentration programs, which originated in their current form (predominantly focused
on class instead of race) in the same time period as the War on Drugs.
In Section III, I identify white interests concerning deconcentration and expand on
the idea that white interests interweave themselves with white reasoning to keep
whiteness itself from becoming a category of contestation. Whites can stay within the
“perpetrator” perspective. 8 This psychological barrier is augmented by spatial barriers
that form disassociation between people. Whiteness is largely typified by a lack of
appeal to group or “race” based distinction, but is instead grounded in individualism.
This grounding in part relieves whites of taking responsibility for the acts of past whites. 9
Whiteness is not directly perceived, but rather is utilized to maintain the auspices of a
merit-based system, and to keep property allocation non-racialized. Spatial arrangement
after World War II made it possible to distance the normative and psychological thoughts
of whites (suburbanization was federally backed through white-only exclusionary
practices). 10 This created a psycho-spatial predicament in that residential segregation
allows for the further distancing of oneself from groups perceived in an “other” based
outsider status, while simultaneously reaffirming group-based privilege within an
individualistic paradigm.
In Section IV, I look at the intersection of prison-based exclusion with housing
dispersal programs based on the white interests identified in Section II. Because the
psycho-spatial disassociation created in the 1940s through the 1960s allowed the
perception of, and thus the perpetuation of, the city as criminal, the result of these
policies was to remove (via prison) large numbers of low-income black males from
central city neighborhoods under the rubric of safety. Not coincidentally, mass
incarceration started, in earnest, by the mid-1970s. 11 There is thus an overlap between
the removal of low-income non-whites for both deconcentration and for prisons. Both
provide justifications of social goods (e.g., to increase stable housing or to decrease
8

See infra Section II.A. This perspective helps to cast oppressive elements as irrational and unfounded
(and thus non-existent) precisely because one in a position of power will not see the framework as
marginalizing some people.
9
A common sentiment from personal experience seems to be that “they” (as a group) should be able to pull
themselves up out of their conditions. This also means, in part, that “they” should be able to transcend their
group—that pulling oneself up means shedding group status to some extent.
10
See infra Section II.
11
See infra Section III for a much more specific treatment.
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crime) and both rely on white interests in a relatively non-racialized (or individualized)
category as well. Moreover, prisons represent a renewal of concentrated poverty, but remake it in the countryside, and often with a perceived economic boom to ailing rural
economies.
¶10
In Section V, I trace the incarnation of this mental and spatial framework into the
process or contact point of the redevelopment of inner cities, focusing particularly on
white reclamation of such space as non-racialized and non-criminalized property.
Whiteness here operates to neutralize the previously criminalized space into the
perception of an economic gain based on merit. Within this guise, participation becomes
limited to a relative consumerism and public space is transformed to private space that
explicitly and purposefully serves to disassociate the user from the spaces’ racially
manipulated historical past. In this way, the construction of inner cities is not linked to
white (and only white) flight a generation earlier. Those that live here must socialize and
assimilate to this rationality-based individual model. Like the older suburban model of
expansion a generation ago, the current model is a claim on property and space that
works to reduce the possibility of public space and multiplicitous association. This time,
though, the lens turns inward as the inner city is revitalized.
¶11
In Section VI, I look at the implication for this new interest-convergence, and begin
a query of how to expose and respond to it. Because the deconcentration-convergence
can represent an obfuscation of group-based claims to oppression, limit meaningful social
discourse with one’s community, and allow white interests to become reaffirmed in a way
that does not alter the fundamental normative (not necessarily material) nature of
segregation itself, 12 responses must include bringing white interests to the surface while
tracking the connections between the deconcentration-convergence with its two main
contact points. This also necessitates folding in a spatial analysis of social relations,
especially concerning prisons. Please keep in mind that the interest-convergence
dilemma is multi-pronged in that it does not argue that whites unilaterally benefit, but
instead that there is a convergence of interests, where white institutional interests are
appealed to; the model is not one of linear or uni-dimensional change.
II. THE INTEREST-CONVERGENCE DILEMMA, DECONCENTRATION, AND SPATIAL
DIVERGENCE
¶12

This section works to fill in background information. First, I provide the Bell
interest-convergence dilemma in more detail. Then, I move to examine the spatialized
inequality that occurred in the post-World War II years and throughout the civil rights
movement concurrent with the Brown decision. This time period (1940s-1960s)
evidenced large numbers of whites leaving city-centers with explicit government backing
that kept non-whites from the newly burgeoning suburbs. Finally, I will lay out the main
policies that work toward the deconcentration of the poor in the formal sense. Each of
these policies typically works by abolishing previous tower-style public housing (which
partially concentrated poverty in the first place) and providing vouchers for a move to a
different neighborhood or location.
12
It is important to remember that the interest-convergence does allow blacks to receive help from
ameliorative programs. Further, whites do not have to be fully or even partially conscious of the process
that I write about here on an individual level.
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A. Bell’s Interest-Convergence Dilemma and Brown v. Board of Education
¶13

In 1954, de jure segregation in schools was equated with discrimination. Brown
mandated integration based almost explicitly on this previously sanctioned, and lawful,
exclusion or spatial isolation: “the plaintiffs . . . by reason of the segregation complained
of [are] deprived of the equal protection of the laws.” 13 An integrative ideal (to make
schools racially mixed) was seen as the tool to provide parity in education, because the
previous “separate but equal” mandate in Plessy v. Ferguson 14 was not working. In a
sense, it was outdated because possible enforcement was farcical. While there have been
vast amounts of scholarly exegesis on this case, Bell’s particular article stands out. In a
response (twenty-six years after the decision) he argued that Brown was more
advantageous to white interests than black interests (although this did not mean that
Black interests were not fulfilled to some extent). Bell explains: “Translated from
judicial activity in racial cases both before and after Brown, this principle . . . provides:
The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it
converges with the interest of whites.” 15 There are three reasons from Brown that benefit
whites:
First, the decision helped to provide immediate credibility to America’s
struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of
emerging third world peoples. . . . Second, Brown offered much needed
reassurance to American blacks that the precepts of equality and freedom
so heralded during World War II might yet be given meaning at home. . . .
Finally, there were whites who realized that the South could make the
transition from a rural, plantation society to the sunbelt with all its
potential and profit only when it ended its struggle to remain divided by
state-sponsored segregation. Thus, segregation was viewed as a barrier to
further industrialization in the South. 16

¶14

Bell did not argue that blacks did not benefit at all from Brown, but that blacks will
only benefit when whites also benefit—and that the benefits to whites could typically
play out as more salient over time, and thus augment white institutional monopoly in a
relatively greater way than it helped to undo black oppression. Bell’s claim worked to
bring white interests to light by connecting them with black placement previous to
Brown, arguing that we must necessarily expose those on the top of the hierarchy as well
as the harms to those on the bottom, to make social change. Further, when changing the
dynamics of this relationship, it is necessary to change it holistically, rather than in
fragments. When white interests are not seen or remain silent they can be upheld and
even morph into stronger forms.
¶15
The dynamic of structural change as an interwoven relationship between races also
parallels the visibility of race. Non-whites are “raced” because they are not considered
the norm, which is, in turn, whiteness itself. Whiteness then remains invisible mentally
13

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 18 U.S. 538 (1896) (upholding the “separate but equal” doctrine).
15
Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518, 523 (1980).
16
Id. at 524-25 (footnotes omitted).
14
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and physically so it does not have to yield to reality of group-based advantage. “Whites
may agree in the abstract that blacks are citizens and entitled to constitutional protection
against racial discrimination, but few are willing to recognize that racial segregation is
much more than a series of quaint customs that can be remedied effectively without
altering the status of whites.” 17 Likewise, in Brown, whites were not seen as a racialized
group that holds power. Whiteness remained diaphanous, the default category toward
which others could model behavior, and actions, to become equal, not only in access to
material goods, but through the ideological or mental process of deciphering what
constitutes racial inequality. By implying that whiteness is the goal, the shedding of
racial identity is, for other groups, necessary to unbind various iniquities. Once this
occurs, people should bind themselves to the legitimacy of the individual actor model,
wherein groups are seen as somewhat irrelevant and individuals are the correct focus for
social analysis. Thus, the “free” market (as opposed to the black market, or the slave
market) can operate un-impinged as the primary space of human interaction.
¶16
By linking interests of blacks and whites in this way, Bell problematizes not only
the ease with which Brown could be carried out, 18 but the ideal of integration overall.
Because integration-based discourse threatens the superior status of middle and upper
class whites, 19 Bell’s argument works to expose whites’ power status as non-neutral. His
view is not one of hopelessness, but of pragmatism, because it entails the principle that
we must gain an accurate descriptive point of departure for meaningful prescriptive
solutions (and to understand why people prioritize certain solutions). In other writings,
Bell has advocated for a racial realism, which entails understanding racism as permanent
first, before advocating more typical civil rights concerns, which may see racism as
solvable. 20 This is diametrically opposed to the ideal implied in the rational actor model,
wherein we individually work toward collective betterment and progress on all social
fronts, racial or otherwise. The rational actor model thus mimics the idea of indirect
group support through individual betterment.
¶17
A troubling outcome of this dichotomy is that the extinguishment of segregation
through integration-based means can come from an authentic and selflessly situated
perspective and still become inimical to its own goals. This is part of the psycho-spatial
continuum reliant on the spatial distribution of separate groups. “Bad actors” do not have
to know they are acting badly. Moreover, good actors, seeking to do good things, can
still maintain foundational misunderstandings, especially concerning race, which can then
further entrench initial problems and can even exacerbate them by relying on
misunderstandings to form policy.
¶18
Because desegregation ideas emergent from Brown mimic deconcentration policies
that seek to undo concentrated poverty, it is worthwhile to examine deconcentration with
the analytical framework from Bell’s article. Deconcentration policies also seek to tame
inequality through asserting a differential association, 21 one that relies on role models,
neighborhood effects, and myriad other similar arguments; arguments which, when seen
collectively, all rely on the same premise as Brown itself: deep seeded inequality can be
17

Id. at 522.
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (mandating integration “with all
deliberate speed”).
19
Bell, supra note 15, at 523.
20
See generally BELL, supra note 7, at 93-108.
21
Differential association simply means interaction with a heterogeneous population.
18
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ameliorated through changing the dynamic of isolation or separation to provide a higher
level of multiplicity and access to goods. Both recognize inequality as spatial, and both
proffer a spatial solution. But, according to Bell, such interactions cannot operate as
solutions that exist in a vacuum of racial neutrality for whites. Such programs or
decisions have larger implications for white interests themselves. To examine this
relationship and expose white interests, though, it is first necessary to quickly lay the
basis of the spatialization of inequality in the post-World War II years.
B. Spatialized Inequality Concurrent with Brown Set the Stage for Deconcentration
¶19

Ironically, Brown’s timing coincided with a period of intense and new racial
segregation in the country. Deconcentration policies are directly linked to Brown in this
sense because they both deal, in part, with the increase of residential segregation after
World War II. From the 1940s-1960s, the United States population was spatially
rearranging at a rapid pace. The Interstate Highway, 22 slum removal programs (to make
the space for those highways), bank support for whites moving to the suburbs, and public
housing concentration in poor areas of inner cities, all explicitly racialized and catapulted
white suburban growth through the post-World War II boom years. 23
¶20
For example, the Federal Housing Administration and the federally-created Home
Owner’s Loan Corporation offered model drafts of racially restrictive covenants (and
provided loans for mostly whites) through the 1940s and 1950s, purposefully creating
racially homogenous neighborhoods stretching away from central cities. 24 Such
covenants were attached to the deed of a piece of property (e.g., a house), literally
restricting, via race and legitimized by law, to whom the house could be sold. And, the
amount of homes being sold at this time was great: ten million new homes were built
between just 1946 and 1953. 25 Consequently, between 1946 and 1959, less than two
percent of the housing financed with federal mortgage insurance was for blacks.26
Residences in cities were concurrently razed: between 1957 and 1968 at least 330,000
urban housing units were destroyed directly as a result of federal highway building
alone. 27
¶21
By the 1970s, according to historians Massey and Denton, most cities had become
“black reservations.” 28 Stated plainly, highways were built through mostly black
neighborhoods so that massive white expansion could happen in the suburbs. Those left
22

See generally TOM LEWIS, DIVIDED HIGHWAYS, BUILDING THE INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS, TRANSFORMING
THE AMERICAN LIFE (1999). The legislation for the highway system was passed in 1956, two years after
the Brown decision.
23
See ARNOLD HIRSCH, THE MAKING OF THE SECOND GHETTO 10 (1998) (arguing, inter alia, that
“government urban redevelopment and renewal policies, as well as massive public housing, had direct and
enormous impacts on the evolution of the ghetto.”).
24
DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 54 (2003). People could then use these
pre-made drafts knowing they were legally legitimate.
25
Dolores Hayden, Building the American Way: Public Subsidy, Private Space, in THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC
SPACE 38 (Setha Low and Neil Smith eds., 2006).
26
ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX, A STORY OF SEGREGATION, HOUSING AND THE BLACK
GHETTO 113 (2006).
27
Raymond A. Mohl, Planned Destruction, The Interstates and Central City Housing, in FROM
TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES, IN SEARCH OF AN URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
AMERICA 227 (John F. Bauman, Roger Biles & Kristin M. Szylvian eds., 2000).
28
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 24, at 57.
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in need of housing in the cities were often put into public housing towers, which were
concentrated in very specific areas as well, often next to highways, and concentrated
internally because they were not single family homes; hence the term “concentrated”
poverty. But keep in mind that the term refers to an area that was manifested as a small
piece of the overall re-organization of metro areas generally. Further, these trends
occurred nationwide. 29 The FHA manual itself warned that the “infiltration of . . .
‘inharmonious racial groups’ would lead to declining property values.” 30 For example:
the city of San Antonio was divided by Loop 410, “a highway that circles the city and
defines inner and outer loop differences in quality of life, schools, housing development,
and municipal services. Inside the loop, 96 percent are non-Anglo and poor, and housing
prices average $20,000, while beyond the loop, residents are mostly Anglo and wealthy
. . . [homes] average $200,000. 31
¶22
Further practices by banks, like redlining (declining to offer a mortgage in inner
city residential certain areas), held these exclusionary outcomes fairly constant for some
time, as they could be justified in a non-racial manner, 32 even as the technical law on the
books began to catch up to the practical inequities. It is hard to overstate the way in
which federal policies provided monies in a racialized manner to remake city-suburban
patterns. 33 Importantly, the monies provided for much of this development was federal
and siphoned through state and local governments as part of the New Deal program.
Before moving to examine the white reasoning that was produced from this respatializing of the country, it is important to look at some of the deconcentration policies
themselves.
C. Deconcentration of Poverty Programs and Dispersal
¶23

The genesis of deconcentration programs as applied primarily to class instead of
race (or a mixture of both) came to fruition throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but was
based on the initial separation of inequality residentially, as stated above. 34 Such
programs were initially tied to race, however. 35 The “second generation” programs
(based predominantly on income), which include HOPE VI, focus on the demolition of
older public housing and encourage increased mobility of the participants to different
neighborhoods. 36 Initially, for example, HOPE VI required a one-for-one replacement of
29

See, e.g., William Julius Wilson, From Institutional to Jobless Ghettos; When Work Disappears: the
World of the New Urban Poor, in THE CITY READER 126 (Richard T. LeGates and Frederic Stout eds.,
1996) (In Chicago’s Woodlawn neighborhood, for example: “In 1950, almost two-thirds of Woodlawn’s
population was white; by 1960, the white population had declined to just 10 percent.”); WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 47-49 (1997).
30
POLIKOFF, supra note 26, at 113.
31
Elizabeth Blackmar, Appropriating ‘The Commons’: The Tragedy of Property Rights Discourse, in THE
POLITICS OF PUBLIC SPACE 91(Setha Low and Neil Smith eds., 2006). Also, crime is mentioned as a
problem much more frequently in the loop as compared with those that reside outside of the loop.
32
Redlining, in particular, is still a hotly debated topic. See, e.g., Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, Redlining in
Boston: Do Mortgage Lenders Discriminate Against Neighborhoods, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
(Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 96-6 1996), available at
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp1996/wp96_6.pdf.
33
These programs also originated broadly in New Deal programs.
34
GOETZ, supra note 1, at 52-53.
35
Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F.Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
36
See Mark Shroder, U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev., Moving to Opportunity: An Experiment in Social
and Geographic Mobility, CITYSCAPE: A J. OF POL’Y DEV. AND RES., Vol. 5 No. 2, 57-67 (2001), available
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housing, but this is no longer the case. 37 A one-for-one replacement would guarantee that
tenants received some form of housing after their then-current housing was demolished.
“From the late 1980s through most of the 1990s, HUD policy moved toward and finally
adopted a paradigm that emphasized dispersion. Unlike the first generation dispersion
efforts . . . [second generation deconcentration] was firmly tied to concentrated
poverty.” 38 The overall basis for such programs was, of course, spatial: concentrated
poverty had become a popular concept, 39 and the idea that HUD must take an affirmative
role in undoing concentrated poverty made sense (given that it helped produce such
neighborhoods). Concentrated poverty also offered a new way in which to view the old
problem of segregation, and it did so under a model that allowed people to conceptualize
segregation as tied to an explicit policy choice rather than the externality of accumulating
individual choices. Deconcentration programs then naturally respond to the extreme and
protracted nature of residential segregation—and they respond in a way that impacts most
directly those that were structurally disadvantaged in the first place.
¶24
Goetz identifies five main housing policies that form the basis for deconcentration
style assistance: (1) a shift from project based to tenant based subsidies, 40 (2) increasing
the ability to use Section 8 vouchers in neighboring communities, 41 (3) income mixing in
public housing, (4) scattered-site public housing and redevelopment, and (5) the HOPE
VI program. 42 The HOPE VI program is especially relevant because it involves the
demolition of some or all of the units of a public housing development to provide for
redevelopment of the site as mixed-use and mixed-income. Approximately 100,000
public housing units were scheduled for the first 10 years of program funding, with the
net loss of units projected as high as 60,000. 43 Overall, these five policies revolve around
the idea of mixing communities into varied income levels, and work toward moving
people from areas of concentrated poverty to relatively non-stigmatized areas. The
HOPE VI program may be the most visible part of this set of policies. Often, the people
that were living in housing affected by HOPE VI are given financial supplements
(vouchers) to find new housing.
Synopsis, Section II
¶25

Section II summarized Bell’s interest-convergence argument, the increasingly
spatialized way that inequality operated from the time of Brown, and then looked at
deconcentration policies that currently work toward helping those in concentrated
poverty. It is now necessary to spell out what type of symbolic and metaphorical white
interests are present or embedded in these policies before going forward to examine the
contact points of prison and inner city gentrification, where white interests recapitulate
at http://www.huduser.org/Periodicals/CITYSCPE/VOL5NUM2/shroder.pdf.
37
See id.
38
GOETZ, supra note 1, at 54.
39
Myron Orfield, now a Professor at the University of Minnesota Law School, works assiduously to expose
the pitfalls of concentrated poverty.
40
This shift means a change from housing assistance (actual physical places) to financial assistance to
obtain housing on the private market.
41
Section 8 vouchers are a primary form of financial assistance.
42
For specific information, see U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, HOPE VI – Public and
Indian Housing, available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/.
43
GOETZ, supra note 1, at 60.
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themselves economically and normatively. In Section III, I will explicate white interests
in deconcentration, like Bell did when examining the Brown decision, all of which
revolve around keeping the group nature of white privilege invisible and individualistic.
III. WHITE INTERESTS: INVISIBILITY, NEUTRALITY, PROPERTY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
¶26

The interest-convergences dilemma does not say that white interests, and white
interests alone, will be expanded, while black interests are wholly suppressed. Instead,
the phenomenon is dilemmatic because white interests will supercede black interests
through time, and efforts to help blacks will also work to further solidify white interests.
The process is subtle; white interests will not be adequately exposed, operating in a
neutral way, through different avenues than overt racism. The important aspect of
interest-convergence to apply to deconcentration policies is the exposure of white
interests in the process.
¶27
Whiteness itself is not and will not be defined in an overtly racialized manner.
White posturing instead holds onto a version of color-blindness toward its own privilege.
Bonnie Grover writes that “white[ness] is transparent. That’s the point of being the
dominant race. Sure, the whiteness is there, but you never think of it. If you’re white,
you never have to think of it.” 44 As whiteness has been institutionalized into a means of
residential success 45 it has mutated into an economic forum—it can be equated with
property interests and even property itself. 46 Operating as such, multiple arenas that
might typically involve race stigma have been castigated or removed from racial context
precisely because they are fundamentally raced as white. “Racing” as white is likewise
synonymous with a de-racializing generally because it changes the way in which race is
conceived. De-racing provides that one can and should come out of a group-based status
and supplant it with an individual ethos that stresses merit progress toward realizable and
concrete goals. This is not to deny that whites operate as a group through individual
actions (nor through economic actions), but instead to say that the justificatory
mechanisms available to whites rely precisely on the appeal to a non-racial standpoint.
Such a non-racial standpoint is important for groups that hold power because it does not
allow them to be viewed as groups but works to maintain the group-based power
nevertheless.
¶28
In this sense, whiteness performs a rhetorical and theoretical link to an apolitical
standpoint, one that can decapitate conflict and promote permanent and numerous social
constructions that then work to perpetuate inequality, even when seen as a salve, and
even when actually helping those upon which oppression depends. If we accept Bell’s
logic that races cannot operate unilaterally without affecting each other in racialized
ways, it is important to expand on potential white interests in deconcentration programs.
This section aims to begin that project. In Section III, I will trace the linkages of white
44

Bonnie Kae Grover, Growing Up White In America?, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND
34, 34 (Richard Delgado and Jean Sefancic eds., 1997).
45
“Government-sponsored segregation helped inscribe in American culture the equation of ‘good
neighborhoods’ with white ones. In the process, of course, they made all ethnic groups that had access to
these neighborhoods ‘white—something that had at one historical moment or another been uncertain . . .
[for various groups].’” Martha R. Mahoney, Residential Segregation and White Privilege, in CRITICAL
WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 273, 274 (Richard Delgado and Jean Sefancic eds., 1997).
46
See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993). See infra Section IV.
THE MIRROR
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interests and property through the contact point of the prison system. Please keep in
mind that the white reasoning I am particularly concerned with relies fundamentally on a
spatial disassociation—relatively rigid segregation—that was explicated in the last
section. Deconcentration programs may actually prove to further this kind of exclusion,
enabling justification for affluent white solidification. Like Bell’s ideas in relation to
Brown, these are normative and symbolic points that have material consequences.
A. Deconcentration Programs Maintain the Neutrality or Emptiness of Whiteness as a
Racial Category
¶29

“[An] . . . important feature of the rhetoric of Brown I was the Court’s treatment of
the rhetorical theme of white innocence. On this issue, the Brown I opinion offered a
howling silence.” 47 The reason behind such silence was that whiteness is not seen as a
category, and as such, government could not, and would not, make laws or policy that
respond to something they will not recognize as problematic. In deconcentration policies,
whiteness (the ability to move to predominantly white neighborhoods) was facially
replaced with a primarily economic justification. 48 Yet, even in their racial vestige,
deconcentration policies originate from a racialized claim (the Gautreaux decision); they
too usurp whiteness as a point of assimilation rather than contestation. It is natural to
want to achieve residential integration because it is easy to see that black ghettos exist
because of residential segregation. The public housing authority in Chicago was seen as
at fault because of its choice of public housing development placement in non-white
neighborhoods. It would be much more controversial to mandate in some manner that
whites move to inner city neighborhoods, thereby allowing mixed income communities.
This idea seems counterintuitive, but points to the nature of our valuation of such
communities, and the temporal disassociation present in deconcentration—as luxurybased communities are popping up around former areas of concentrated poverty.
¶30
This logic continues to manufacture whiteness as if it is neutral or non-existent. 49
Whites can claim that they possess no historically-linked privilege because they do not
see their skin color as an issue. 50 Deconcentration programs gear themselves toward an
invisibility of whiteness, which increases the reliance on the construction of whiteness as
a corollary goal. According to Audrey G. McFarlane, there are two sets of competing
narratives when considering urban restructuring: “1) the individualized narrative of
market logic, free choice, private property ownership rights, and inevitability; [and] 2)
the structural narrative of race and class subordination.” 51 Deconcentration programs
work prescriptively to place self-identity affirmatively within the first narrative, so
actions are not seen within the second category. This is important because the second

47

Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE
MIRROR 89, 96 (Richard Delgado and Jean Sefancic eds., 1997).
48
Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 915 (N.D. Ill 1969).
49
See infra Section III for gentrification concerns.
50
“The claim that whiteness lacks form and content says more about the definitions of culture being used
than it does about the content of whiteness.” RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS 199 (1993). Frankenberg performed multiple interviews. She says
that “descriptions of content of white culture were thin, to say the least.” Id.
51
Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated Affluence and the
Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L 1, 26 (2006).
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narrative is necessarily silenced when the first type of narrative monopolizes discourse
and critical assessment (though it continues silently).
Following a non-racialized rational choice model dictates certain behaviors—it
corrects what is in error: a lack of funds and spatial separation. Racism is not part of
white reasoning because reasoning is, by definition, itself detached from such social
categories or contexts. “Only bad people do it.” Economic-based reasoning has served
as a process toward the extraction of race toward more mechanical issues like rational
choice behavior. But, like the interest-convergence arising in Brown, it was not
conscious, rational white interests that proved necessary to maintain huge levels of
segregation, but rather a misunderstanding of what racism means to help change it. Often
times, racism is couched through the definition of the other as racialized, rather than
looking at whiteness itself as a racial category that works to inform cultural norms that
maintain power or agency from a group angle. Yet, a generation ago, affluent whites
more overtly understood these dynamics: “These [largely southern] communities
understood that white self-interest demanded a certain degree of accommodation to
integration demands. Thus, in many moderate southern cities, white elites, especially
business leaders, played critical roles in facilitating limited racial integration as a means
of preserving a strong business environment.” 52
The latent beneficial act of helping low-income blacks bolsters the interestconvergence theory as black interests couple with white interests but remain relatively
subservient to them. This does not mean that progress has not been made, but that
progress is difficult to track on an individual level because of an ideological march
toward equality of opportunity for that single actor. 53
But opening doors does necessitate hospitality. Adrienne Davis reinforces this
view when she writes that “privilege is rarely seen by the holder of privilege.” 54 Thus,
opening doors may seem, from the position of a holder of privilege, all that is necessary
to do, as they (the privileged people) would need nothing more if faced with perceived
opposition. Deconcentration programs mimic this analogy by creating the ability to deny
that one is consciously—or individually—responsible for a racist system as racism is
made invisible through spatial disassociation. 55 After all, if I would simply need access
to a house (and could assume hospitality based on past experience), there would be no
need to further increase other inter-related opportunities once inside.
Thus, the shift from predominantly race-based deconcentration schemes coincides
with an increased focus on income, which provides a quantitative measure of progress
that sees deep-seeded social issues as solvable through individual economic means. That
52

David M. Douglas, The Quest for Freedom in the Post-Brown South: Desegregation and White SelfInterest, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 117, 117 (Richard Delgado and Jean
Sefancic eds., 1997).
53
Alan Freeman argues that antidiscrimination law exists inside of the “perpetrator” perspective, whereby
“the law views racial discrimination not as a social phenomenon but merely as a misguided conduct of
particular actors. It is a world in which, but for the conduct of these misguided ones, the system of equality
of opportunity would work to provide a distribution of the good things in life without racial disparities.”
Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1054 (1978).
54
Stephanie Wildman & Adrienne Davis, Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible, 35
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881, 883 (1995).
55
Instead, financial means are secured and, because deconcentration programs exist with the mission of
alleviating these problems through integrationist means, there is no need to worry about individual
placement as fundamentally group based. The underlying push is to make groups into individuals.
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is, it shifts the lens into the “perpetrator perspective,” 56 scrambling further understanding
and action. Coming inside of the house does not mean one does so on his or her terms, or
his or her measurement of what power and equality means. Psychologically, whites have
no normative standpoint toward changing conditions in the racial realm because they will
not always understand their own whiteness and what it has meant to their self identity. It
is much easier to focus on economic justice, as John Edwards did when launching his
presidential campaign in New Orleans. 57
B. Neutrality Leads to Residential Placement for Whites as Merit-Based and Natural
¶35

The spatial distance of whites from center cities allowed a homogenized
perspective to become entrenched in a way that is mapped physically—and such
psychical separation in turn creates a disassociative mindset. In this way, place and
psychology interweave themselves so that, while whites do not have to understand
themselves as a group that receives privilege, they also do not have to confront the
possibility that this might be the case. Whiteness has been associated with property and
wealth, though. In fact, Ruth Frankenberg reports from her studies that “Whiteness was
often signified in these narratives [her interviews of white women] by commodities and
brands.” 58
¶36
Middle- and upper-income whites, then, do not need to understand their own
residential placement as a conscious or subconscious choice mired in privilege. But, the
construction of whiteness as an aspirational norm is as important in understanding
inequality as the demonization of blackness, perhaps more so. For instance, often times
“good neighborhoods” are defined by a host of amenities (e.g., parks, schools, crime
rates) that include a basis in financial capacity, and are thus desirable places to live.
Whites can see through whiteness to this type of rationality when choosing what
neighborhood to live in. 59 Bad neighborhoods, by contrast, are seen as uncomfortable,
but such discomfort is not based on the lack of amenities through a reasoned or patterned
process of decision making. It is often based, rather, on visible stigma.
¶37
This mark of invisibility is a luxury or outgrowth mirrored in affirming one’s
placement as one’s own responsibility, and not originated from the place he or she
occupied previously. The placement of whites residentially, then, is often seen as noncontroversial and an obviously basic factor excised from race. As a non-white, though,
according to David Schneider in his book, The Psychology of Stereotyping, “indirect
forms of discrimination are . . . unremitting and a constant part of the social environment
56

This is a central concept in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
(Crenshaw, et al., eds. 1995).
57
John Edwards, in announcing his campaign for the Presidency, recently utilized mostly black children as
a backdrop to his populist points, primarily concerning poverty. See Dan Balz, Washington Post: Edwards
Turns to Non-Traditional Campaign Model, Dec. 28, 2006, available at
http://johnedwards.com/news/headlines/ wp20061228b/.
58
FRANKENBERG, supra note 50, at 199. “A far-reaching danger of whiteness coded as ‘no culture’ is that
it leaves in place whiteness as defining a set of normative cultural practices against which all are measured
and into which all are expected to fit.” Id. at 204.
59
Further, real estate brokers will likely “steer” potential homebuyers to neighborhoods that they perceive
as a match to the homebuyer’s socio-economic or demographic status, such that the idea of choice is
necessarily limited to some extent. Xavier De Souza Briggs, Politics and Policy: Changing the Geography
of Opportunity, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN
AMERICA 310, 313 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005).
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they inhabit.” 60 He further says that “ordinary social encounters contain minefields and
are accompanied with layers of meaning others do not need to confront.” 61
¶38
These “layers of meaning” mostly do not have to exist for a person in a privileged
position—that person can only see one merit-based reality, where reasons are linear and
rational and actions taken have direct correlation with benefits received. For many in a
privileged position, individual choices inform material accumulation. This is a reflection
of the ideal of a marketplace, the only group-based organizer allowed in such a worldview, and one that is thus seen as natural. Hence the oft repeated appeal of “letting the
market work” uninhibited.
¶39
Because some people have been located in neighborhoods of horrific poverty—
because they did not have the choice of where to live, and because we inherently value
such an individual choice—it is only right, in the market model, that they be given a
relative choice to leave such a neighborhood, to live where they can accumulate more
social and economic goods. Deconcentration programs do focus on this kind of
individual alleviation, and have produced results in some instances. 62 What must occur
for this to happen, though, is assimilation into the individual framework, or a cue to
become racially invisible.
¶40
Whiteness is symbolically excluded from the merit-based game, even though it is
wrapped up in the assessment of figuring out one’s “worth.” 63 This is ironic when placed
into the market framework because groups are not supposed to have advantage. This
factor of interest-convergence can likewise be a good thing for non-whites—they gain
benefits once they are in a place to garner individualized praise from whites. 64 Once
accepted into the idiom of personal responsibility, blacks may not be seen as usurping
white space and property because of their skin color, but because of their hard work. But
this is a protracted benefit that requires the overcoming of a substantial road-block,
especially in a relatively short time (post-move). Overall, the end point here is seen as
full assimilation, wherein universal neutrality is possible, and, importantly, where the
market can allocate benefits where they are deemed needed. Such a process can be
dangerous because it divorces history from current politics of exclusion. Races exist in
groups outside of whiteness, but if people are to exist within whiteness, they will not
have a race that is recognized as such, despite gaining group-based goods, or being
denied such goods.

60

DAVID SCHNEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF STEREOTYPING 293 (2004). Further, “[m]embers of minority
groups live in states of perpetual attribution ambiguity about the reasons for others’ reactions to them (‘Did
he make that snide remark because he’s an idiot, or because he’s having a bad day, or because I’m
Hispanic?’), and this ambiguity is surely not conducive to tension-free interactions . . . .” Id. at 294.
61
Id. at 293.
62
GOETZ, supra note 1, at 50-60 (summarizing studies).
63
“In ways so embedded that it is rarely apparent, the set of assumptions, privileges, and benefits that
accompany the status of being white have become a valuable asset that whites sought to protect and that
those who passed sought to attain — by fraud if necessary.” Harris, supra note 46, at 1713.
64
“When behavior is largely inter group, SIT [Social Identity Theory] makes a strong prediction about the
effects of decategorization. Recall the theory’s suggestion that our social identities are anchored in
identifications with various groups. Knowing that we are similar to members of outgroups threatens not
only our identities, but (indirectly) our sense of self-worth. To the extent that breaking down category
boundaries leads to feelings of increased similarity with outgroup members (and that this is threatening),
people in each group will be motivated to develop even stronger notions of distinctiveness with consequent
devaluation of the other group.” SCHNEIDER, supra note 60, at 396.
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C. The Concept of Whiteness and Property Intermingle
¶41

Property itself is not often seen as racially linked with whiteness. Like defining a
“good neighborhood,” property functions as a justification that defines some nonracialized goal, which in turn provides a place where white transparency is based on an
alternative definition, often economic progress. 65 In part, “[t]he failure of today’s racial
discourse lies in its belief that property is neutral.” 66 When we shift to a largely
individualized worldview, group claims are increasingly difficult to cognize,
communicate about, or to initiate as a basis for remedy. 67 Groups become thought of as
historical vestiges, left over from the times of overt racial discrimination or immigration.
In turn, property status is often affirmed as neutral 68 even though we know allocation of
property after World War II was highly racially skewed. Oddly enough, though, while
we do have a history of de jure class-based discrimination in the United States, it was
never codified in law. Class-based modes of behavior were always socially enforced, and
certainly, people have talked about such themes before, but they were never enforced by
law as a form of exclusion. 69 Law has not, though, always been color-blind. Instead, we
have a rich history of skin color-based segregation in formal institutions, residential
spaces, and within individual interactions. It was not until 1967, just 40 years ago, for
instance, that persons with different skin color could marry each other legally.70 It is
ironic, but consistent, that economic-based progress is politically emphasized as the main
route to social betterment for historically marginalized groups.
¶42
The concept of property interests in whiteness is best explained by Cheryl Harris in
her seminal piece, Whiteness as Property. In the past, argues Harris, “white identity
conferred tangible and economically valuable benefits, and it was jealously guarded as a
valued possession, allowed only to those who met a strict standard of proof.” 71 In this
guise, white actions are not racially charged once the paradigm shift occurs from race.
One can almost always replace individual, 72 market, or personal choice (choice that is
65
Barbara J. Flagg, Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, Fashioning a Legal Remedy, in
CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 85, 85-87 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic
eds., 1997). “Just as whites tend to regard whiteness as racelessness, the transparency phenomenon also
affects whites’ decisionmaking; behaviors and characteristics associated with whites take on the same aura
of race neutrality. Thus, white people frequently interpret norms adopted by a dominantly white culture as
racially neutral, and so fail to recognize the ways in which those norms may be in fact covertly racespecific.” Id. at 87.
66
Wilhemina Wright, Examining the Property of Rights in Whiteness, in Racial Reflections: Dialogues in
the Direction of Liberation, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 106, 107 (Richard
Delgado and Jean Sefancic eds., 1997).
67
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S 229 (1979) (requiring personal intent to discriminate for a discrimination
claim).
68
“The concept of a property right in whiteness thus highlights white racial solidarity over class-based
interests. There are two sides to this property right in whiteness—for poor whites, it may mean forgoing
economic improvement for white exclusivity; for minorities, on the other hand, it may mean gaining
economic improvement at the expense of racial solidarity.” Lisa Castonon, “Whiteness” Rights Exercised
by People of Color, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES, LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 108 (Richard Delgado and
Jean Sefancic eds., 1997).
69
Law has always been “class-blind” even though our society most obviously is not. Law does sometimes
recognize and remedy individual class disparity (e.g., waivers for court fees).
70
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
71
Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV 1707, 1726 (1993).
72
IRIS YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 43 (1990). “This individualistic social ontology
usually goes together with the self as independent. The authentic self is autonomous, unified, free, and
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seen as non-negotiable or unknowable) in the place of a possibly racialized choice and we
will have no “real” way to tell the difference as observers. It is also at times possible that
the speaker will not have the ability to fully distinguish their own claims.
¶43
Whites often refer to the non-white areas of town with a racial lens whereas the
“good” areas of town are very rich, or desirable in a non-racialized manner. For example,
North Minneapolis is seen as scary, dangerous and a place to avoid—it is
characteristically black. 73 Edina is a desirable place to shop and live—it is a rich suburb.
But we rarely refer to Edina in a racialized term such as “white.” Race is given a
backseat, income rises as predominate in choice, and the process is seen as a rational
extrapolation from the natural fact of hard work. Property interests are not to be
questioned because they are assumed to exist, especially in the context of home
ownership. Property is then one aspect of whiteness and is similar to whiteness in its
relative invisibility and individualizing tendency.
Synopsis, Section III
¶44

This section has extrapolated on white interests as “unseen” or neutral group
dynamics that establish and maintain powerful forces of social organizing. Further, white
interests are often seen in the lens of economic marketplace-based ideology wherein
individual gain and individual merit are affirmed as synonymous. Deconcentration
programs operate under this guise. The interest-convergence involved in deconcentration
programs helps mostly low-income non-whites reach a better material position, while
fragmenting group-based identity and social structures for those people involved
methodologically as the assimilative end goal. This process is reinforced by the similar
invisibility of property accumulation as neutral, which in turn maintains, legitimizes, and
grounds the color-blind, merit-based model. This model further entrenches whiteness as
non-existent in a cyclical fashion that can then be re-formed and strengthened in various
subtle, and rarely problematized areas, like property.
¶45
Section IV examines how white interests and concentrated poverty operate within
the first contact point of the deconcentration interest-convergence dilemma, within
prisons and incarceration. In Section V, I will trace how whiteness as property reemerges to form the second contact point of the deconcentration interest-convergence by
examining inner city redevelopment after the confluence of deconcentration and prison
policies. Both policies work by utilizing similar justificatory schemes.
IV. WHITE INTERESTS REFLECTED IN PRISONS, SHIFTING INNER CITY CRIMINALITY
¶46

It is no accident that “the new figures represent a record 33-year continuous rise in
the number of inmates in the United States [and that] the current incarceration rate of 738
per 100,000 residents places the United States first in the world in this regard.” 74 The
increase is more than five hundred percent since the early 1970s. 75 Just fifteen years after
self-made, standing apart from history and affiliations . . . .” Id.
73
When I first moved to Minneapolis, I was advised that the entire city is “safe to explore, except North
Minneapolis.”
74
The Sentencing Project, New Incarceration Figures: Thirty-Three Consecutive Years of Growth, 1,
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/inc_newfigures.pdf.
75
Ryan S. King, Marc Maer, & Malcolm C. Young, The Sentencing Project, Incarceration and Crime: A
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desegregation orders were given in Brown and the concurrent policies of massive
suburban construction for whites had taken form, cities were beginning to be thematized
as criminal—and actualized as such—justifying the rise in prisons and reduced social
financial allocation to inner cities. It took policies from the Reagan and Bush
administrations to escort them, 76 but this process would have been impossible without the
structural racial segregation pre-existent to the 1970s and 1980s. The “Bureau of Justice
Statistics figures for 2005 indicated that there were nearly 2.2 million inmates in the
nation’s prisons and jails, representing an increase of 2.6% (56,400) over the previous
twelve months.” 77
¶47
Both prisons and deconcentration programs, then, move people around with
implicit appeals toward the idea of betterment of certain groups. Deconcentration moves
a group to the individual level and fragments that group status over a larger area in an
attempt to rectify past group-based wrongs. Prisons take distinct groups from the greater
population under the auspices of individual culpability to protect other groups that remain
outside of prison. In this section, I argue that prisons further white neutral standing
toward white power by focusing on economics and safety concerns in the abstract, rather
than how they re-institute group-based advantage and disadvantage. For instance, there
are economic white interests in prisons because they provide great wealth for
corporations. Prisons also overlap with deconcentration policies in that many people are
from the same neighborhoods in which both “spatial organizers” operate. The main
conclusion of this section is that prisons re-establish concentrated poverty (and thus
severe segregation) in a new arena, the countryside. Prisons are, in essence, a new
segregation for a new era. Section IV shows how this allows city space to be
reconstructed for the usurpation of, and appeal to, authentic white interests.
A. Prisons Maintain and Further a Neutral Individual White Stance Toward Racial
Disparity
¶48

One must ostensibly get to prison through one’s decisions or choices, 78 as such
people that go to prison are largely seen as rational actors whose choices led to
unacceptable, unwarranted, and even selfish behavior. 79 Under the auspices of a neutral
process of procedural or substantive justice, individuals (and not groups) perform acts
that result in their incarceration. This exists despite the highly racialized group-based
nature of incarceration inside of prisons. Gangs in prisons are consistently highly racially
Complex Relationship, 1 (2005), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/inc_iandc_complex.pdf; The Sentencing
Project, supra note 74 (“The number of federal prisoners in custody has increased by 97% in the last
decade.”).
76
See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 4 (1995) (“Indeed,
the threat of incarceration seems to drive the system, often causing criminal justice officials to base critical
decisions almost entirely on this factor rather than weigh it as one of the many issues to be considered in
the fair administration of justice.”).
77
The Sentencing Project, supra note 74.
78
Of course, one can also neglect to act in a certain way, and there are various examples of crimes that do
not involve a rational choice. Individual culpability still remains the unit of analysis. The question often
revolves around a psychological claim: whether this person perceived what could be called the reasonable
person, or criminally, what gradation on a continuum of culpability their mental status fell.
79
I am less concerned with sketching all of the traditional justifications for imprisonment. Suffice it to say
that we have currently ventured far from a rehabilitative model.

46

Vol. 2:1]

Justin Stec

identified. For example, “[r]acial violence has beset the California prison system since
the 1970s, when gangs like the Mexican Mafia, the Black Guerrilla Family and the Aryan
Brotherhood fought for power. Last [month] in Chino, officers put down a fight between
60 black and Latino inmates in an eating area.” 80
¶49
Viewed through a group lens, the procedure of incarceration and its legal
justifications provides an example of a tremendously racially disparate process and
outcome. Many more inner city non-white men (and increasingly non-white women) are
in prison than are white men or white women. Black males are incarcerated at more than
six times the rate of white males. “In historical perspective, the 910,000 African
Americans incarcerated today are more than nine times the number of 98,000 in 1954, the
year of . . . Brown.” 81 And, black males are a much smaller segment of the population to
begin with, so that one of every eight black males between the ages of 25 and 29 is
incarcerated on any given day. Given that statistic, it becomes difficult to deny that
group-based oppression is emergent in this arena. Group-based oppression includes the
production of the conditions that necessitate acts deemed illegal so that certain sections of
the population will be affected more than others.
¶50
On a further spatialized group level, prisons and incarceration policies remove
specific populations from particular neighborhoods in inner cities and transport them to
rural areas. This is amplified in certain states like New York, California, Texas, Florida,
and Illinois, where large urban areas often form the supply chain to prisons. Consider, as
Paul Street reports, “[a]s of June 2001, there were nearly 20,000 more black males in the
Illinois state prison system than the number of black males enrolled in the state’s public
universities.” 82 This removal is predicated on the ideal of safety. Remove the bad actors,
keep the good. This is a foundational reason that seems disassociated with race or racial
patterns. Yet, prisons are a multi-billion dollar a year industry that hold disproportionate
numbers of poor and non-white people.
¶51
The War on Drugs, especially, operated as a political strategy with drastic
consequences for inner cities and specifically, the non-white occupants in those cities. 83
Because inner cities were seen as dangerous (remember that Willie Horton was
introduced during this time 84 and that the super-max prison became a reality 85 ), dangerous
80
Joe Mozingo, Chino Prison Remains Locked Down. Officials Assess Security After a Brawl Involving
200 Inmates Leaves Seven Hospitalized. The Racial Riot Doesn’t Appear to Be Gang Related, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2007 (Cal. Metro) at B1, available at 2007 WLNR 19818.
81
The Sentencing Project, supra note 74, at 3.
82
PAUL STREET, THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: RACE, PRISON, JOBS, AND COMMUNITY IN CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, AND
THE NATION 3 (2002), available at
http://www.thechicagourbanleague.org/file_uploads/theviciouscircle.pdf.
83
TONRY, supra note 76 (“[R]ising levels of black incarceration did not just happen; they were foreseeable
effects of deliberate polices spearheaded by the Reagan and Bush administrations . . . . Anyone with
knowledge of drug-trafficking patterns and of police arrest policies and incentives could have foreseen that
the enemy troops in the War on Drugs would consist largely of young, inner-city minority males.”).
84
TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF
EQUALITY (2001).
85
The term “supermax” came from the concept developed from the permanent lockdown of the Federal
penitentiary in Marion, Illinois dating from 1983 when two corrections officers at that prison were
murdered by inmates in two separate incidents on the same day. Since then, some maximum security
prisons have gone to full lockdown as well, while others have been built and dedicated to the Supermax
standard. CHASE RIVELAND, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SUPERMAX PRISONS:
OVERVIEW AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 5 (1999), available at http://www.ncic.org/pubs/1999/
014937.pdf.
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people had to be displaced. 86 This displacement alone would not put white suburbanites
into a psychological position to move into cities again—it would not assuage their fears,
but those fears drove the rationalization for group incarceration. The mental conflation
here is that white fears are mapped onto the justification when whites living in suburbs
were safe.
¶52
Seen from a perpetrator perspective,87 the appeal to locking up criminals made
sense because the perpetrator perspective does not see stark segregation as a necessary
problem to fix, and people in such positions will not exist on a daily level “seeing” the
world around them as segregated. They may perceive immediate threats at times;
however, this will form the basis for a conclusion that group restructuring must occur.
This makes sense given that the mass incarceration movement is perceived as divorced
(and operates as if disconnected) from the intense residential segregation causing agents
of the 1940s through the 1960s, which in turn allowed and justified further white flight in
the 1980s from inner cities. As cities were increasingly constructed as dangerous (and
became dangerous, especially when social safety nets were systematically erased 88 ), it
allowed prison construction to boom because policy makers could appeal to a safety
factor that existed. This branding of cities as “criminal” was easier because of psychospatial disassociation and fear it could manifest in the suburbs. It is not surprising then,
that “the fastest growing kind of public space in America,” according to Sharon Zukin,
“[is] prisons. More jails are being built than housing, hospitals, or schools.” 89 If whites
were currently being incarcerated in the way that blacks are, this mask of neutrality
would not be maintained. 90
¶53
Prisons Provide Wealth for Private Corporations
¶54
Prisons, their design, construction, and operation, are couched inside of
economically prosperous terms (in the policy field) as well as criminal justice terms (in
the legal and policy realm). “The $2 billion private prison industry was launched in the
mid-1980s after a decade of ‘get tough’ sentencing reforms had swelled prison
overcrowding to crisis proportions in the United States.” 91 Private prison companies, like
the Corrections Corporation of America, provide services for every aspect of
incarceration. On their website, they report that:
[An] estimated two million individuals are incarcerated in our country
today and the inmate population growth continues to rise between 3 and 5
86

“Reagan launched the massive multi-agency South Florida Task Force . . . . The program became a
template for the later and larger Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program. By 1984 the
OCDETF had created a series of thirteen regionalized federal operations based in ‘core cities’ including
New York, San Francisco, Detroit, Baltimore, Houston, San Diego, and Los Angeles. . . . At first the [Task
Forces] went after . . . distribution networks, but soon the Justice Department announced that these elite
drug cops were targeting users . . . .” CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN
THE AGE OF CRISIS 47 (1999).
87
See supra notes 8, 54, and accompanying text.
88
PARENTI, supra note 86, at 47.
89
SHARON ZUKIN, THE CULTURE OF CITIES 24 (1995).
90
There are, of course, “white power” based groups that rely on the idea of an authenticity of whiteness and
that a diminishment of such authenticity has occurred. Stated otherwise, such groups are frustrated that
group-based whiteness has not maintained a dominant and neutral position.
91
Judith A. Greene, Entrepreneurial Corrections: Incarceration As a Business Opportunity, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 95, 95 (Marc Mauer and Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 1998).
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percent annually. More than 12 percent of all federally sentenced
offenders and approximately 6 percent of state prisoners are currently
managed by a privately-operated corrections management company - and
those figures are growing. Numerous states including New Mexico,
Colorado, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, and
Wisconsin house between 20 to 50 percent of their inmates in private jails
and prisons. Texas has the largest overall privatization program with more
than 40 private jails and prisons capable of handling nearly 30,000
inmates. 92
¶55

One should do business with CCA, according to their website, because they offer
effective management and specialization for what is, and will always be, an increasing
issue—the growing number of criminals. The CCA has a vested stake in socially
defending the rise of criminal behavior as permanent and ongoing because it mandates
that we “deal” with an undeniable problem, rather than prevent it.
¶56
The CCA is also an extremely lucrative company. The value of CCA’s shares
soared from $50 million when they went public in 1986 to more than $3.5 billion at its
peak in 1997 and was ranked among the five top performing companies on the New York
Stock Exchange from 1995 through 1997. 93 There are strong business interests in the
prison industry, whether through the construction of prisons, their maintenance, or the
tremendous amount of goods that prison labor provides, especially for the federal
government. 94
¶57
Prison construction and the perpetuation of large scale incarceration, then,
maintains a strong economic weight that affects how ideology is formed. It also
represents a more fully incarnated shift from overt white interests to an economic-based
justification for similar outcomes. Private prisons appeal to the idea that they can offer
more effective business. While financial rewards go to profit making companies, they
also replace ailing rural industrial centers, where some towns seek to acquire prisons
badly (for employment opportunity). Like residential segregation though, removing
prisons from areas where many people can see them visually allows a mental barrier to
form against the existence of the prison in the first place. Importantly, this removal of
people, this drastic new form of segregation, allows previous inner cities, when coupled
with deconcentration policies, to be “re-branded” away from the symbolically criminal to
the symbolically luxurious. 95 Before moving to the appeal to luxury as a higher form of
white group-based economic reasoning, it is important to look at how prisons and
deconcentration policies focus on the same arenas, and how concentrated poverty is being
re-made in the countryside.

92

Corrections Corporation of America, Why Do Business With Corrections Corporation of America,
http://www.correctionscorp.com/whycca.html (last visited May 24, 2007).
93
Greene, supra note 91, at 99-100.
94
See UNICOR Online, About Unicor, http://www.unicor.gov/about/organization/history/foreword.cfm
(last visited May 24, 2007).
95
See infra Section V for more on how this process operates.
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B. Prisons Populations Come Primarily from the Same Neighborhoods That
Deconcentration Programs Focus On
¶58

Todd Clear argues that “[B]ecause poor men of color live in concentrations in
neighborhoods that are racially and economically homogenous . . . the places where these
men live are particularly hard-hit by incarceration.” 96 Clear also says that massive
incarceration from particular communities works to undermine social controls in those
communities and thus actually decreases public safety or increases crime.
Deconcentration takes people out of those neighborhoods altogether—but not ex-felons,
as they are not immediately eligible. 97 But both can disrupt social networks and both rely
on the individual model of causation. This social and spatial fracturing allows previous
neighborhoods of crime to be redefined and makes it less likely that ex-prisoners will be
able to find a social safety net upon reentry, even one that is necessarily limited. Instead,
it can concentrate where ex-prisoners live after prison time is served, often in extremely
segregated areas where social goods are hard to find.
¶59
For example, waiting lists for public housing assistance are extremely long.
“Without access to decent, safe, and affordable housing, the likelihood of an ex-offender
being able to obtain and retain employment and remain drug- and crime-free is
significantly diminished.” 98 So, when re-entry of prisoners occurs, most of them remain
marginalized, unable to assimilate, and hence, more likely to recidivate. Recidivism rates
remain high. 99 And, over 600,000 people are released from jails and prisons per year.
The cyclical fashion of the prison industry assures that many will not be able to function
in a mainstream manner because they will not acquire the skills to do so, which will
sustain and potentially increase prison growth.
C. Prisons Remake Concentrated Poverty in Rural Areas
¶60

Finally, prison policy works to re-establish concentrated poverty in the countryside
rather than the inner city, making it mentally and spatially removed from mainstream
society, and away from former social networks. Further, the prison system is set up to
naturally re-formulate its population based on efficiency and capacity. Prisoner re-entry,
typically into neighborhoods at the cusp of concentrated poverty, maintains enclaves of
96

Todd R. Clear, The Problem with ‘Addition by Subtraction’: The Prison-Crime Relationship in LowIncome Communities, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT 181, 184 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 1998). “The dynamics of growing
concentrations of the residents of certain neighborhoods going to prison (and jail) are not insignificant for
these locations.” Id.
97
“The new laws also give local [housing] authorities discretion to deny admission to applicants with other
kinds of criminal records. In particular, they permit, but do not require, local housing authorities to deny
public, Section 8, and federally assisted housing to households if a member has engaged in any drug-related
or violent criminal activity or any other criminal activity that would adversely affect the health, safety, or
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents if the criminal activity occurred a ‘reasonable’ time
before the person seeks admission. The federal laws do not define how recent a conviction must be to be a
‘reasonable’ basis for denying housing.” Gwen Rubinstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing—
Denial of Benefits to Drug Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MASS IMPRISONMENT 37, 45-46 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 1998).
98
Id. “Finally, by excluding people with criminal records from public housing, these laws interfere with
the ability of families to successfully reunify once a parent has returned from prison.”
99
See The Sentencing Project, Recidivism of State Prisoners: Implications for Sentencing and Corrections
Policy, available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1064.pdf (nearly two thirds recidivate).
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former poverty in geographically proximate areas. 100 Ex-prisoners get isolated from
social networks and meaningful integration while felons are often dissuaded from
participation in society generally: “Felons are often barred from having drivers’ licenses
and being hired for certain jobs even when those disabilities have no relevance to their
crime.” 101 Even an identification card, while necessary for public benefits, is hard to
obtain. 102 “Over the same period of time that prisons and criminal justice supervision
have increased significantly, the laws and regulations that serve to diminish the rights and
privileges of those convicted of crimes have also expanded.” 103 In this way, prisons work
distinctly to cycle people out of, and back into, lock up and to maintain certain conditions
that make it more likely for participation in the alternate economy. This is supported by
the extremely specialized role of prisons in the overall criminal justice system. It is rare
that prison companies are forced to help socially reintegrate ex-prisoners, educate
prisoners, or train them for meaningful employment. Just the opposite occurs—training
for low level employment.
¶61
Prisons are seen as “sources of economic growth [and have] become vital to the
development strategy of many small rural communities that have lost jobs in recent years
but hold the lure of cheap land and a ready workforce.” 104 People in economically ailing
rural areas can thus gain some employment potential from prison construction. “Prior to
the decade of the 1980s, prisons were seen by most Americans as essential social
institutions, but not ones to be welcomed ‘in my backyard.’ But then the collapse of rural
economies and a lack of jobs paying a living wage set the stage for public officials and
private entrepreneurs alike to begin pushing prison construction and operation as a
leading rural growth industry . . . .” 105 As the decline of industrial centers occurred in
rural areas, increasing pressure to find an adequate solution grew. Now, rural areas have
even come to depend on such policies. 106 Prisons came to replace some of the lost living
wage salaries that more classic industry used to provide. As such, the existence of rural
prisons is now weaved into the fabric of community life in many places, and the idea of
removing prisons will likely be opposed by local residents. “All in all, about 350 rural
counties have acquired new prisons since the start-up of the prison boom began in 1980,
and more than half of all rural counties added prison work to their available employment
mix . . . .” 107 Further, the demographic split between the prison population and a local
rural population will necessarily play a role within the prison, and within the community,
in shaping racial attitudes, and world views generally. “While racism is not a new feature
100

See Nancy G. La Vigne, Cynthia A. Mamalian, Jeremy Travis, & Christy Visher, A Portrait of Prisoner
Reentry in Illinois, available at http://www.urban.org/publications/410662.html.
101
Peter Edelman, Where Race Meets Class: The 21st Century Civil Rights Agenda, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (2005).
102
Further, instituting public benefits in a timely fashion after time served in prison (where benefits are cut
off) is extremely difficult.
103
See Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT,
THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 16 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind
eds., 1998).
104
Marc Mauer, Race to Incarcerate 10 (1999).
105
Greene, supra note 91, at 111-12.
106
See Tracy Huling, Building a Prison Economy in Rural America, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 197, 197 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds.,
1998) (“Hundreds of small rural towns and several whole regions have become dependent on an industry
that itself is dependent on the continuation of crime-producing conditions.”).
107
Id. at 199.
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of the U.S. prison system, efforts to address the problem are undermined by the trend
toward building prisons in rural areas where the work force is predominantly white and
prisoners are predominantly people of color.” 108 A manifestation of this dynamic, for
example, occurs when “in at least six states, guards have appeared in mock Klan attire in
recent years.” 109
¶62
Because prisons are seen in rural areas as abstract governmentally engineered
businesses, there exists a disassociation behind the rational for economic opportunity.
That opportunity hardens the perspective that the prisoners exist in the prison for a
legitimate reason, and not for business objectives, because the economic needs of a
region depend on the existence of the prison. They are inextricably linked. Further, the
supply for these prisoners is often explicit as drug-based policing focusing on users clears
inner cities out. “In Washington, D.C., for instance, law enforcement unleashed
Operation Clean Sweep—a year-long offensive against drug use and street sales in the
city’s Black neighborhoods . . . . In all, Clean Sweep netted over 28,000 arrests . . . [and]
half of all homicides [that year] were deemed drug-related, compared with only a third
the year before . . . .” 110
Synopsis, Section IV
¶63

In this section, I have argued that middle and upper income white interests are
furthered through prison expansion in a few crucial ways. First, prisons operate under the
ostensibly neutral rubric of crime, dangerousness, and safety, and thus partially further
the racial category of whiteness itself (by keeping it invisible) despite the fact that the
impacts of prisons disproportionately affect low-income non-whites and affirm white
advantage. These rationales fuel the construction of meaningful and legitimate needs to
exercise what is a highly racial re-spatializing of people. The rationales themselves are
not simply empty, but instead hit at the weakest possible segments of the population to
help garner institutionalized benefits for different sections of the populations.
¶64
Second, prisons are a money-making enterprise for private prison industries and for
ailing rural economies generally. This is a largely white economic advantage, in the
context of the stock market (or generally, money made on money) and as a tool to
regeneration of some rural areas. Both have grown and been marketed from increased
incarceration rates in a financially lucrative manner. Third, and importantly, prison
populations overlap in their origin with the populations that deconcentration programs
wish to serve, both geographically and temporally. This fact is ironic, as deconcentration
seeks to undo government-sanctioned marginalization while increased incarceration
operates in the opposite way: it works to displace and isolate many of the same types of
people who were isolated a generation before through explicitly racialized rules. White
interests are furthered here through the lack of racialized rules, instead using rationales
that have a racial effect but no overt racial diction.
¶65
Fourth, prisons remove people from cities and re-form concentrated poverty in the
countryside. In this way prisons re-make concentrated poverty in areas where it is seen
as economically beneficial to largely white towns in ailing rural economies. This
108

Id. at 208.
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PARENTI, supra, note 86, at 59.
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removal and reconstruction of concentrated poverty is beneficial to middle- and upperincome whites who want to move to the inner city as well. It mimics the decentralization
of the 1940s through the 1960s of suburban sprawl, except this time, inner cities are the
new desirable places. Such movement is the topic of the next section.
¶66
Overall, prison policies and deconcentration policies work together to make
available cheap land that has less attachment to sticky social and historical racial
dissonance. This new segratory casual factor allows the erasure of white privilege on a
structural level. Land that can be reclaimed is safer. Such land is more appealing
because the threatening aspects of the land has been changed and moved away. This new
land appeals to luxury, and the basis of such an appeal is exclusionary luxury. Needing
to attract people, this luxury based appeal is utilized to compete with the comforts of
suburbia. Whites do not need to be confronted with drastic inequality (which may be felt
individually as discomfort) but can safely move into cities under race-neutral guidelines.
V. GENTRIFICATION AND THE SHIFT TO WHITE INTERESTS IN THE INNER CITY
¶67

Gentrification provides a second context to the interest-convergence surrounding
deconcentration, as both an outcome and a motivating factor. The idea that it will exist
drives economic policy of local governments, and serves as a reminder of where these
policies are going practically. The process of redevelopment also stands atop of nonracialized claims via property consumption and exclusion based on the solution to inner
city woes: the exclusion of malign or unwanted elements as a precursor to attracting
different types of people. Gentrification is often perceived as a positive phenomenon: it
builds a necessary tax base, allows the opening of new shops, increases infrastructure and
reinvestment, and awakens older city areas. It also often brings about a new crowd that
helps put attention on areas of town that might not have had a focus on them before.
¶68
Yet, gentrification is contingent on the subtle precursor of removal or exclusion, 111
though it too represents a convergence of interests and does not yield to a one-sided
analysis. Displacement does not always occur through major and overt public policy, but
results from the echoes of those processes. Not all gentrifiers are white, of course, and
the process does not always bring people back into city centers in the numbers that some
would like to see. Redevelopment could also include the building of attractions, like
street-based mall designs, sports stadiums, and other private sector encouragement for the
reinvestment in a community. 112 The issue is that such transformation rarely takes into
account the needs of current neighborhood dwellers as much as it concentrates on who it
would like to attract to such an area.
¶69
Land in former or changing areas of concentrated poverty, for instance, is cheap
and provides ample space for this redevelopment: “They are open territories for
investment speculators, redevelopment agencies, and affluent professionals who reject
the suburban form of living, but demand, and can easily pay for, luxury residential,

111

Remember that the interest-convergence dilemma allows blacks to benefit, but makes this benefit
largely contingent and subservient to white interests. The arguments presented here are not necessarily
“pro” or “con” deconcentration, but work to contextualize the procurement of such policies.
112
See generally Audrey G. McFarlane, Who Fits the Profile?: Thoughts on Race, Class, Clusters, and
Redevelopment, 22 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 877 (2006). “The environment must exclude anything or anyone that
contradicts the image of the safe experience . . . .” Id. at 883.
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commercial retail, entertainment, and other intangible spatial amenities.” 113 Such
remodeling might not change the status of poverty, but sometimes reshuffle it to make
tracking poverty harder.
¶70
Redevelopment through gentrification is also fueled by (and fuels) the cyclical
dynamic between prisons and deconcentration programs, as it is a point of reclamation of
city space for whites in the form of property and access made available (in part) by those
two previously detailed programs. Public space in cities can be remade into accessible
and non-threatening areas by allowing commercial enterprise that exhibits points of
familiarity to consumers and in turn disassociates the negative perception of attributes in
inner cities so common in the 1980s.
¶71
This process is tracked, though, precisely in the trajectory through whiteness as a
non-racialized category, wherein a lack of group definition is paramount, and
participation via consumption is central and appealed to, but unstated. Gentrification
itself works to make the city a non-racialized place. Whiteness is mapped into
gentrification. Cities—and especially public spaces in cities—should be free for
everyone, so that nobody is excluded. This is the appeal of a color-blind redevelopment
model that focuses on economic asset building for struggling city governments: “Urban
places that were once racialized as Black and classified as poor, dangerous, and off-limits
to anyone of affluence and with choices, have taken on new meaning today.” 114 The two
important points here are that luxury-based appeal changes inner cities to attract the
affluent and to increase affluent concentration and that, as this occurs, city streets and
former public spaces change and decrease in their availability to those without financial
capital. Centrally, cities can be “re-branded” as elite and luxurious, which foundationally
changes public space, interaction, and human relations toward a market approach. This is
the final “white interest” taken from deconcentration programs via Bell’s interestconvergence dilemma.
A. Attraction of the Affluent to Neighborhoods in Transition
¶72

In the beginning of potential redevelopment, inner cities yield to urban “pioneers”
like artists and young professionals. 115 This exists when the city-space is still considered
too risky to be inhabited by the more established (i.e., the “professional”).
Redevelopment schemes try to increase affluent concentration to replace concentrated
poverty. “This is done through privately and publicly sponsored redevelopment projects,
which reconfigure existing land uses to create commercial, retail, and residential
amenities that are attractive to the upper-middle class.” 116 Over time as businesses are
drawn into the area, city space is often re-crafted to appeal to the aesthetic of a “main
street.” This appeal to an aesthetic and authentic porous spatial map of community is
lacking in suburbia, 117 and is more possible in cities because of greater relative population
113

McFarlane, supra note 51, at 5.
Id. at 4-5. “This intervention by state and local governments has taken many forms: incentives to urban
professionals to locate in certain neighborhoods such as first time homebuyers programs, settlement cost
forgiveness programs, other incentive grants and loans for purchasing residential real estate within the city
. . . .” Id. at 6.
115
See generally Neil Smith, The New Urban Frontier (1996).
116
McFarlane, supra note 51, at 17.
117
There are, however, rebuilt main streets all throughout suburbia—but they require one to drive to the
destination to experience it, and to leave one’s car in a non-visible location when inside the main street
114
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density. McFarlane argues, though, that “the specific techniques to structure the retail
environment in a way that shapes the new inner city by accelerating or concentrating . . .
affluent transformation has not been adequately considered” and warns against a full
scale approach in this manner. 118 Such transformation often also works to superficially
incorporate the culture that has been existent since white absence, but does so in a limited
or commercialized way. 119 Zukin follows this line of thought, arguing further that
“gentrification revived the upper-middle class’s identification with cities by appropriating
culture.” 120 Some of the former residents can find employment opportunities in the
burgeoning service industry that these changes represent.
¶73
In this way, whites do not have to see or understand inequality, but instead can find
cute neighborhoods with an appeal to a history that might not have historically existed in
their present form, but which whites can nevertheless identify with as authentic and
accepting. Stated within a racial discourse, whites can find comfort here because of the
seeming lack of group definition of the space. The focus on older looking streetscapes
also serves as a point of legitimacy for whites to exclaim that the space was there
“before” they were—because it presents itself as “historical” it is also somewhat
permanent in the minds of the participants—the space itself is not implicated as
something manufactured explicitly for affluent non-racialized appeal. 121 It is, instead,
manufactured toward an appeal to authenticity and permanency, exactly the opposite of
the fluidity or restructuring of the city in the past. In this manner, white interests are
satiated while connecting with the sense of place a city brings.
¶74
Such commercialization appears non-racial because it is based on the ethic of
inclusion through consumption and the ideal of safety. One can safely consume without
being confronted with racial inequality. Actions can be justified by asserting that anyone
is allowed in these areas, that they are non-exclusionary. But in fact, the notion that these
are safe areas where such “free” consumption can occur is predicated precisely on the
exclusionary dynamic that exists to define whiteness itself as a sort of nothingness—
uncontroversial or normal—that submerges white institutionalized power into economic
language, which should be received as relatively arbitrary, or free market-based. People
that do not participate in the shopping environment (because they have no money or do
not fit the model shopper, or because they are uncomfortable) are not welcome and are
often physically excluded, but they are excluded on ostensibly individual reasons.
¶75
Further, it is not clear whether such a strategy works: “This upper-middle class
attraction strategy is mainly based on practical logic, although its success as social policy
is largely untested or unproven.” 122 Whites in these new arenas of residential space
vignette. They are both indoor and outdoor.
118
McFarlane, supra note 112, at 879.
119
Jon Goss, The “Magic of the Mall”: An Analysis of Form, Function, and Meaning in the Contemporary
Retail Built Environment, 83 ANNALS OF ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 18, 24 (1993) (“Enclosed
streetscapes refer to the idealized, historic middle-American Main Street or to exotic streets of faraway
cities . . . if only because the contemporary North American street invokes fear and loathing in the middle
classes.”). Think of various ethnic foods offered in such areas.
120
SHARON ZUKIN, LANDSCAPES OF POWER: FROM DETROIT TO DISNEY WORLD 258 (1991).
121
See generally Neil Smith & Setha Low, The Imperative of Public Space, in THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC
SPACE 9 (Neil Smith & Setha Low eds., 2006): “Perhaps inevitably, the new highly privatized metropolis
has provoked a nostalgic reaction, an antisuburban suburbanism, if it can be put this way, represented by
everything from gated communities to the so-called ‘new urbanism’ as a design fashion.”
122
McFarlane, supra note 51, at 10.

55

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2007

excise their historical and present link to privilege, both psychologically and physically.
If visibly poor people exist in such areas, they create dissonance for the middle upper
income person seeking to go about his or her business. Dispersal programs work to
augment this phenomenon (to allow space to exist in accordance with one’s worldview)
in a sense because they remove visible reminders of inequality.
B. Public Space Diminishment is Concurrent with Redevelopment
Genuine public space in these areas is quickly disappearing. 123 The areas are
controlled for points of access in an effort to keep things clean, orderly, and relatively
calm. Many strategies to restrict people from what once was public space are used, from
easements, to the buying up of private property encircling a public space or public
amenity. 124 Because people will not move into the city if it is not seen as safe, there is a
constant effort on the part of redevelopers to minimize the visibility and existence of
people that might break this presentation, and to assert that people with “discriminating”
tastes, for example, are invited. Laws excluding the homeless from parks, that forbid
panhandling, that make illegal everyday activities in a public form, and other such
restrictions, operate as barriers to those trying to subsist on a daily level. 125 Gentrification
is linked with the perpetuation of concentrated poverty because both push low-income
people of color away from resources and opportunities. 126
¶77
Gentrification processes also preserve the individual, color-blind, merit-based
model. In short, as condos populate former cultures of inner city poverty areas, an
increased aesthetic of the shopping mall exists to meet this new demand. Goss argues
that “developers have sought to assuage this “collective guilt over conspicuous
consumption by designing into the retail built environment the means for a fantasized
dissociation from the act of shopping.” 127 Goss’s insight is compelling, especially when
collective guilt is inspired from the underlying notion of exclusion instead of
consumption. Consumption is a means in which to alleviate guilt by disassociating
oneself from the causal dynamics of one’s situation. Goss further argues that mall spaces
purposefully exclude political action, communication, and thinking outside of the
paradigm or role of participating consumer. In downtown centers, there is a similar need
to exclude, not only politics, but also one’s choice to come to such a place as a racialized
choice. Participation in one’s community within this context becomes consumerist—
based on disposable income necessary for leisure activities. 128
¶76
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“Common property is an individual’s right not to be excluded from the uses or benefits of resources.
Historically, common property rights were recognized and enforced for members of a bounded
community.” Elizabeth Blackmar, Appropriating ‘the Commons’: The Tragedy of Property Rights
Discourse, in THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC SPACE 51 (Neil Smith & Setha Low eds., 2005).
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See Setha Low, How Private Interests Take Over Public Space: Zoning, Taxes, and Incorporation of
Gated Communities, in THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC SPACE 83 (Neil Smith & Setha Low eds., 2005).
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See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295 (1991).
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John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving them the Old “One-Two”: Gentrification and the K.O.
of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L. J. 433, 441 (2003).
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As stated earlier, Cheryl Harris argues that whiteness itself is a form property. 129
The whiteness-as-property concept is vividly on display through gentrification processes
that emphasize individual choice through consumerist practices. Harris writes that “[t]he
right to exclude was the central principle, too, of whiteness as identity, for mainly
whiteness has been characterized, not by an inherent unifying characteristic, but by the
exclusion of others deemed to be ‘not white.’” 130 Redevelopment appeals to this sense of
privilege by working to recreate a time before that of criminalized inner cities. It creates
spaces that mimic the downtown pre-spatial rearrangement to foster a sense of
authenticity.
¶79
Property itself is something that one owns unilaterally, wherein the owner can
exclude others to rights of possession. 131 Whiteness functions as property particularly in
new inner cities’ efforts to “reclaim” spaces racially, but it is the presence of non-whites
that adds an allure of the cities as well. Through a process of commodification of the
other, “the inner city stigma morphs into chic, affordable, hot and attractive.” 132 Zukin
writes that “urban professionals appealed to a past that wasn’t really theirs.” 133 The point
is not so much that these professionals usurped space while unconscious of their ability to
act as a group, but that such a move is largely encouraged and not highly controversial.
¶78

Synopsis, Section V
¶80

In this section, I have added the contact point of inner city redevelopment to the
new interest-convergence dilemma based on deconcentration policies. Like integration
and Brown, redevelopment of city-space works to attract the affluent through the
recreation of such space to excise race from that space. It further attracts through the
very dynamic of whiteness itself—appealing to that dynamic by making race invisible for
those that wish to participate in the new place. In this sense, though, it furthers the
psychological dynamic that whites do not have to understand their own privilege as racebased, whereas other groups may not be as comfortable. I then argued that this dynamic
relies on the extinguishment of public space in its traditional form as a commons. This
enhances the reality of exclusion to make these areas appear safe. Laws that limit the
homeless, for example, work in this manner, to reduce the appearance of disequilibrium.
Further, the merit-based individual ideal is also reified when consumption practices form
a basis for participation. Finally, this propertizing of space is seen as neutral because
destructive processes of class, race, ethnicity, and alienation involved in gentrification . . . . The most
traumatic aspect of this analysis is perhaps the destruction of the elaborate and complex community fabric
that is crucial for low-income, immigrant, and minority communities . . . .” Id.
129
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nobody “owned” it before—ownership is itself something that takes away racial meaning.
The street corner, for example, something that has been a source of public space in the
past, is not typically seen as a privately owned public space, despite increasing attempts
to limit loitering non-patrons. In this way, whiteness as neutrality replaces what might be
a raced or group-based understanding of neighborhoods. This re-propertizing, though, is
“raced” through an enduring system and actually defines how white interests are framed.
In the next section, I will quickly look at the implications for this interest-convergence
and lay out some potential responses that take into account the connectivity of the model.
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEW INTEREST-CONVERGENCE
¶81

I have charted out a convergence between black and white interests by applying
Bell’s notion of the idea as he understood the Brown decision. I have established a link
between deconcentration of poverty programs as analogous to the Brown decisions, and
argued that white interests are not visible partly because white interests are never quite
defined in a racialized way like black interests might be, and partly because they are
constructed and reconstructed as non-racial to keep power neutral. The three areas of
convergence mutually reinforce white interests (housing, prison, and gentrification).
Like Bell, I feel that it is vitally important to link black and white interests in order to
understand how inequality operates. The deconcentration of poverty is analogous to
Brown in that it looks at how we can gain greater integration to help a group of
disadvantaged people; and by linking together white interests, by exposing them as
present, we can trace how manifestations of white privilege recapitulate themselves in
various ways and in multiple fields.
¶82
In this particular case, there are two specific and related contexts that work
concurrently or converge with deconcentration to represent white interests. Both of them
focus on inner city neighborhoods, and both alter those neighborhoods through
reassignment of race to different spaces and contexts, concurrent with different mental
frameworks that individualize race. Prisons remove many low-income black males from
inner city neighborhoods into rural areas, and remake concentrated poverty on the
countryside. In many of these cases, drug offenses are the culprit. Moreover, when
people are put into prison for drug usage or sales, social networks in areas of
concentrated poverty are disrupted. These are social networks that could flourish if such
communities were given a few relatively simple resources—resources like appropriate
food, safe mental and health care, supervision of children, education, and areas of
congregation to increase civic participation and neighborhood attachment.
¶83
Similarly, when families move out of these neighborhoods to obtain better housing,
they may often leave members who have been convicted of crimes because many local
housing authorities bar those that have been convicted of felonies in a variety of manners.
Thus, the social systems of the areas of concentrated poverty are further reduced and the
likelihood for drug selling and activity, and other circumstances of illegal behavior (e.g.,
prostitution, property crimes) is increased, especially given cuts in social welfare
spending that remove basic building blocks to a good neighborhood. Recidivism rates
are very high for this reason. Further, as former neighborhoods of concentrated poverty
clear out, upper and middle class whites come in and reclaim the space, de-racing it in the
same way that affirms white interests to stay a non-category for racial assumptions,
which in turn changes the focus to merit-based systems like the market, defaulting many
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out of the community. One important point to stress is that low-income blacks are helped
through deconcentration—but to get such help, they risk other basic life necessities,
including potential community and the ability to be involved in community, and thus,
higher levels of political participation. Further, this kind of help does not alter white
interests, or even expose the theoretical underpinnings of white interests as group-based
advantage; instead, it offers the ideals of merit and individual worth as worthy of
assimilation, and as a singular goal or definition of success.
¶84
Such interests converge upon a spatial make-up that links prisons, gentrification,
and deconcentration programs in a manner that obscures white interests, reifies
segregatory norms, and allows whites to inhabit what were perceived as previously
uninhabitable spaces. White interests are de-racialized, individualized, and disassociated
from any kind of racial claim or awareness through multiple avenues. Brown, like these
policies, did provide some gains as well, and it remains a clarion call for civil rights
activists, academics, and litigators. If nothing else, it helps people organize and form
coalitions to bring more focus on issues of inequality. But, just as Brown occurred
(perhaps only could have occurred) during a time when the country’s racial demographic
make-up was radically changing through further separation, deconcentration policies do
not sit alone within new patterns of urban change. When seen as inextricably linked
with—or even as aspects of—other programs that move people for similar reasons, like
the criminal justice system, or redevelopment demands of gentrification, deconcentration
programs appear in a different light.
¶85
Also like the interest-convergence in Brown, the deconcentration-convergence here
works to make white interests ambiguous; partially through the symbolism that helping
through housing alone is enough to form inclusive bonds with mainstream society (the
other two main categories existent as meaningful employment and education). Bell’s
insight was that a fully-funded and resource-laden, but separate system, would, in a racist
state, make more sense than opening the doors to white schools. This is also true with
deconcentration policies. A fully-funded neighborhood, one that includes necessary
social services, health care, drug treatment (like detoxification centers staffed with
experts), genuine mixed-use public space, proper city services, and genuine employment
possibilities, can begin to prosper without the removal of the residents of that
neighborhood. Rather, the goal should be full involvement and collective action, rather
than the ideology of removal. This is the same distinction between direct and indirect
help. After all, the ideal of removal is one we have seen before: segregation itself is
predicated on the notion that separate equates with an unaffected and disassociated
positioning.
¶86
We should recognize group claims as strong and legitimate. Claims to group
oppression, ever tangential, will only become more removed and harder to locate if we
fragment populations of non-whites through policy. This shift of rhetoric, predicated by
the underpinning of white interests as economic interests, means that the old appeal to
explicit group disenfranchisement is taking on new meaning, fragmenting into multiple
tentacles that overlap increasingly with a mixture of venues and potential reasons that
justify such a make-up. Deconcentration-convergence erases the visibility of groups.
Harris argues that: “[t]he law has recognized and codified racial group identity as an
instrumentality of exclusion and exploitation; however, it has refused to recognize group
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identity when asserted by racially oppressed groups as a basis for affirming or claiming
rights.” 134 This is particularly true within the guise of deconcentration.
Political power is also diluted when people are moved from solidarity-based
positioning with social networks throughout a geographical area. Deconcentrationconvergence can further amputate potential realization by larger institutions about groupbased disenfranchisement, especially when the oppressive actions have moved to new
venues that are federally or state sanctioned, and increasingly hard to track on an
individual level. In the new scheme, participation is altered, and meaningful social
discourse is increasingly “heriarchicalized” in a way that mimics and re-institutes race
hierarchy, where whites do not have to question their own privilege. Race visibility in
inner cities will be harder to locate. This could make ameliorative goals, like fulfilling
neighborhood reinvestment through social services, harder, increasing transportation
needs for those in need, for instance. Further, laws that restrict the participation of exprisoners, especially in market-based interaction, necessarily restrict the ability to find
self-sustenance, and thus, their dependence on alternate means of fulfillment.
Participation and equality of perspectives will be a hard goal to manufacture, as our cities
are becoming more polarized along class.
Thus, the nature of segregation is not necessarily normatively altered because white
mental processes are held intact and whites do not have to see their own privileged status,
whether physically manifested, or mentally evidenced. Whites can operate under neutral
guidelines regarding their own status. Segregation continues unseen, so the harmful
effects that, according to Brown, were directly linked with separation from resources,
must also be resolved. Segregation is omnipresent, however, but highly spatialized in its
current form. We should of course make sure (as many low-income housing advocates
do) that low-income housing is available in cities nearby social networks, infrastructure,
and that proper legal representation exists. This is especially important as cities fill with
more and more amenities for those with capable financial resources. Yet, this is not the
whole story and acts, in some ways, as a band aid to the more fundamental issue.
Another potential response would be to provide some lawful protection against
discrimination of ex-prisoners, both within public housing and overall (e.g., in the
employment setting). This could work like many legal standards, so that an employer
would have to find a reason of denial that is not based on ex-prisoner status. The basic
thought here is that prisoners should not be subject to disenfranchisement once they have
left the prison. If prisons themselves serve as punishment, then re-entry into society
should be as smooth as possible. Yet, laws exist to keep previous felons from voting,
getting a drivers license, and other assorted restrictions, including the context of public
housing. 135 There is simply no way that someone with little social and financial capital
can be expected to find a way back into society in a meaningful way without some
support, whether informational or financial. Without social support systems that can
guide this transition, many will turn to the alternate economy.
Also, because private prison construction, maintenance, and operation, is an
extremely lucrative business, prisons should be mandated to pay for transitional programs
that provide housing. As it stands, many prisoners are released with very little money,
134
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increasing reliance on illegal activities. We know that recidivism is high. We know that
it is cyclical. Certainly, crimes concerning property and drugs do not make
neighborhoods great places to live. Because state and federal government contracts
provide the bulk of prison funding, it would be relatively simple to insert a few clauses or
sections into these contracts that utilize the idea that housing is fundamental to prison
release and re-integration. It seems that if the state is serious about reducing crime, what
they need to do is mandate housing-based programs for ex-offenders. An ex-prisoner
could be guaranteed an apartment to help him or her get on his or her feet, and then seek
stable employment, for example.
¶91
Also, the distance of prisons to city centers is problematic. Closer physical
proximity to cities might be helpful. Families and friends cannot often travel far from
central cities, and so, moving prisoners into rural areas breaks down solidarity on the
intimate social support level as well. Of course, we cannot “move” prisons anymore than
we can move cities. What we can provide, though, are alternatives to incarceration that
focus more on community re-establishment. Why not set up centers in cities, funded by
prison money, that mandate x-year full sentences to programs to help raise awareness
about drugs, or to produce programs concerning career planning and goal oriented
progressive mindsets, to people convicted of drug crimes? Prisons could train these
people in the prison and mandate that they live at the center located in the neighborhood
they were arrested. The “inmate” would be fed and housed for whatever amount of time
necessary, but his or her sole mission would be to produce information, through various
means (like narratives about his own personal story) that could help the community and
provide an alternative sphere for social support. The centers could be placed directly
inside of neighborhoods where such problems are at their worst. This also offers a visible
deterrence to would-be criminals, because they could see the place to which they might
be restricted. This proposal keeps people in neighborhoods, but also provides a change
apparatus. It also aims directly at the idea of separation from community as a means to
solve community problems. Further, we should increase education programming in
prisons, including learning a variety of community and interactive skills. Of course, this
is a model proposal, and could not include every prisoner—but it could replace the
current model in part.
¶92
Overall, we should have less emphasis on removing people from areas of
concentrated poverty. That is, we should try to keep people where they live, but increase
the factors they wish to see in that neighborhood. We should imagine that such a
neighborhood can change without moving any people from the neighborhood in the first
place. We can change poverty itself. After all, we do not problematize concentrated
affluence in the same manner. Concentration, or density, is a desirable phenomenon if
we want to create richly interwoven layers of social interaction and interchange. The
potential to change these neighborhoods for the good without moving people from those
neighborhoods is too great. We do not want to disrupt social networks in a paternalistic
fashion, and more of an emphasis on helping people live—to build social networks, and
thus to increase self-sufficiency of communities by increasing their ability to integrate, as
a community, into the city—is warranted.
¶93
Often times, physical barriers form border areas of concentrated poverty need to be
addressed and extinguished as much as possible because they further separate certain
sections of the city from mainstream activity. The problem is one of isolation—but of
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communities and groups, not just individual people. Moving individuals may result in
further isolation. Therefore, part of what we can work to do is build coalitions with the
environmental movement and start to remove or build around barriers that consistently
imprison communities of concentrated poverty through the guise of environmental
justice. This concept has the ability to enliven debate and to bring about crossdisciplinary work in a way that assesses multiple factors of inequality at once. Areas of
concentrated poverty are often encircled by highway systems, which displaced
neighborhoods a generation ago. Yet, this negative attribute can be seen in a positive
light—with increased reliance on automobiles, these neighborhoods are close to transit
possibilities that can work to make progress into higher levels of services and availability
of resources without moving people away to neighborhoods in the hopes that those
neighborhoods have better resources. However, if we could redirect some highways from
their current placement, we might also find developmental possibility. For instance, in
North Minneapolis, highway 94 borders the riverfront for miles. Yet, in downtown
Minneapolis, the riverfront is increasingly used in a positive light to draw investment.
While the possibility of such a suggestion may not seem practical, the introduction of this
discourse in a policy forum could at least open up fresh ideas for change.
¶94
We should also emphasize how little the political process seems to be aimed at
areas of concentrated poverty. It seems that social problems bar communities from
political participation. This is especially the case with prison policies, but it is vital that
people in these areas become politically aware. Their interests can be based on
neighborhood issues, for example. Further, though, because white and black interests can
converge, blacks in these neighborhoods can be especially strategic and use the interestconvergence not as a dilemma, but as a focal point to attract whites and mixed income
design without displacing low income people of color first to do it. Given that the
interest-convergence exists, it can provide a necessary starting point to think about how
we can restructure neighborhoods—that is, how communities can restructure
neighborhoods—so that group solidarity or complex social networks are not dissolved in
an effort to revitalize.
VII.
¶95

CONCLUSION

Like suburban expansion a generation ago, the new deconcentration-convergence
has the potential to radically transform where and how we live. This time, exclusive city
spaces are becoming the attractive commodity. Myron Orfield has noted that inner ring
suburbs are beginning to look like inner cities did after whites left. 136 This makes sense,
given the changes occurring in inner cities. We must be careful not to simply “reshuffle”
old problems, as they may have a tendency to reform and come back in new ways. The
normative process behind desegregation is something that does not call enough critical
attention to the placement of whites. We need to expand such a dialogue. It is vital that
we connect the dots, so to speak, concerning changing spatial practices in our cities, and
larger criminal policy debate, including a focus on typically non-controversial subjects.
The deconcentration-convergence provides one way to do so.
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